

**The Context between “strategic Autonomy”
and
the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)**

Essay

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Abstract

The European integration process is a very successful story. It realises the idea of peace, prosperity and stability on the European continent for half a billion people from 28 countries. It guaranteed peace between historical enemies for more than 70 years since the end of the 2nd World War. Nevertheless, the European Union (EU) must face new challenges and threats in a multi-polar world. In order to further develop the Union, the EU Member States (EU MS) agreed on the EU Global Strategy and on the concept of “strategic autonomy”. The goal was to create a more responsible, capable and “powerful” EU. Since then, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU made some major steps forward and a lot of research on these steps was done. However, the question on the context between the CSDP and “strategic autonomy” was not answered yet.

In this essay the author wants to answer this key question. At the beginning, this paper describes the history of the CSDP and the implementation of the EU Global Strategy. Furthermore, it answers the question of the preconditions of “strategic autonomy”, the content of “strategic autonomy” and the goals of the CSDP. At the end, the author answers the key question by combining and discussing the different answers to the supplemental questions. A chart of the context of “strategic autonomy” supports the presentation of the author’s double meaning of “strategic autonomy”.

The methodical approach of this essay is the author-based interpretation, also known as hermeneutics. It is based on an intense study of different sources such as EU documents and factsheets, books and academic articles from online journals and the internet.

Keywords:

CSDP, EU, Global Strategy, PESCO, strategic autonomy.

1. Table of Contents

1. Table of Contents	1
2. Preface	2
3. Introduction	3
4. Current State of Research	5
4.1 The Development of the CSDP	5
4.2 The Global Strategy of the EU and current Developments	6
5. Research Gap	8
6. Research Question	9
7. Methodology	10
8. Research and Results of Research	11
8.1 Preconditions of the Development of “Strategic Autonomy”	11
8.1.1 A changed global Order	11
8.1.2 A changed NATO and “America first”	12
8.2 The Content of “Strategic Autonomy”	13
8.2.1 Political Autonomy	14
8.2.2 Industrial Autonomy	14
8.2.3 Operational Autonomy	15
8.3 The Goals of the CSDP of the EU	16
9. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusion	18
9.1 Discussion of Results	18
9.2 Personal Conclusion	19
10. Annexes	21
10.1 List of Abbreviations	21
10.2 List of Figures	22
10.3 List of Literature	22
10.3.1 Books	22
10.3.2 Internet	22
11. Affidavit	25

2. Preface

In 2019 the European Union has among others to deal with five challenges: The migration crises, the war in the Ukraine, the Islamic terror, China on the way to West with the initiative “one belt, one road”¹ and the BREXIT. The Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) and the concept of “strategic autonomy” is an answer to this.

As an Austrian soldier and Officer Cadet of the Theresan Military Academy, the author has been confronted with many issues of the CSDP of the EU. As a citizen and interested observer of a challenging world the author has a personal interest in this topic and believes very hard, that Europe needs a strong Common Security and Defence Policy. This includes the necessity of independence from other powers in a globalised world.

The topic was chosen to improve the author’s knowledge on CSDP and to answer personal questions on the importance and the context of a “strategic autonomy” for the European Union (EU).

Furthermore, the author would like to take this opportunity to wright a word of thanks to Col Assoc. Prof. Harald Gell, PhD, head of the international office of the Theresan Military Academy and Dr. Rastislav Bachora, a junior researcher of the Directorate for Security Policy in the Austrian Ministry of Defence for their support in authoring this essay.

1 Remark of the author: One belt, one road summarises projects and initiatives of China in Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe in order to improve Chinas influence and power along the former silk road.

3. Introduction

For one decade the European Union is more or less in a crisis mode. Due to different reasons, Europe is not only confronted with economic and financial challenges, Europe faces some serious threats for its security as well. In 2008 the breakdown of Lehman Brothers and the invasion of Georgia by Russian troops marked the beginning of a century of instability.²

Today the EU, a common political and economic space of 500 million people, looks back to recent or on-going threats and challenges. The significant ones are listed hereinafter:

- The Arab Spring.
- The war in Libya.
- The migration crisis of 2015.
- The ongoing wars in Ukraine and in Syria.
- The ongoing tensions and armed conflicts in the Middle East, in North-Africa, and in Central-Asia.

In all these regions the EU as such or its Member States are engaged or play a major role.³

One major step was the implementation of the Global Strategy of the EU in 2016.⁴ Additionally, it was of course one answer to improve the security and resilience of the EU. The Union should be able to defend its unprecedented security, democracy and prosperity⁵ and to share these values with its neighbours and partners. In order to do so, the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) says: *“An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to promote peace and security within and beyond its borders.”*⁶

2 Cf.: M. Leonhard. (2017). Ein postamerikanisches Europa. In: BMLVS/ Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik. Sicher. Und Morgen? Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2018. Translated into English the title means: A post American Europe. In: Secure. And tomorrow? Annual Security Policy Forecast 2018. Vienna. P. 52-55.

3 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service (EEAS). Page of EU missions and operations. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en. [7-10-19].

4 Cf.: EEAS (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels. P. 9-10.

5 Cf.: Ibid. P. 9.

6 Ibid.

The following pages should show how the EU is forming an independent security policy. In a way it could be shown, how “strategic autonomy” comes to live in the context of the Common Security and the Defence Policy of the EU. At the beginning the author explains what does “strategic autonomy” mean in general?

Autonomy is very often understood as independence, as the Oxford Dictionary states.⁷ In addition it is defined as “*the ability to act and make decisions without being controlled by anyone else*”.⁸

Strategy, on the other hand, has its origin in the antique Greece and is— among others — still understood as general ship.⁹ In a more modern manner it can be defined as: “*A plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim.*”¹⁰

In order to answer the research questions properly, the author defines “strategic autonomy” as follows: The ability for the EU to act and make decisions independently in order to achieve common long-term purposes including the process of planning and the execution of actions.¹¹

On the following pages the author also shows that this definition will very well meet the understanding of the EU, including the military aspect of the concept “strategic autonomy”.

7 Cf.: Homepage of Oxford Dictionary. URL.: <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/autonomy?q=autonomy>. [3-11-19].

8 Ibid.

9 Cf.: Homepage of Online Oxford Lexicon. URL: <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/strategy>. [3-11-19].

10 Ibid.

11 Definition by the author.

4. Current State of Research

In this chapter the author wants to describe the current state of developments and research, especially in the fields of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. During the research for this paper a lot of information provided by EU’s official bodies could be found. In order to give the reader an overview on this topic the three most relevant subjects will be presented below.

One major problem during the work on this essay was the source of information. Most of the sources are political ones, as the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Commission of the EU, or linked to European or western politics, as there are e.g. the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) or the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. Therefore, a critical processing of the information was important.¹²

4.1 The Development of the CSDP

The history of the CSDP is very well reflected in today’s sciences. Nevertheless, a short view is important for the understanding of the CSDP today.

From the very beginning, the European integration process included the idea of a kind of a European Defence architecture. After the catastrophic World War II, the main idea was to ensure peace between France and Germany and to defend Europe against the threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. Due to these reasons strategic resources should be under supranational control and new technologies, such as nuclear power, should be used for common peaceful means. The foundation of the European Steel and Coal Community in 1951 and the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957 were first results of this policy.¹³ Since then several important steps followed:

- 1954: Modified Brussels Treaty and creation of the Western European Union (WEU).
- 1957: Treaties of Rome.

12 Assessment by the author.

13 Cf.: Rehrl, J. (2017). Handbook CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. Vienna. Armed Forces Printing Centre. Volume 1. 3rd edition. P. 16-17.

- 1969: Davignon Report introducing the concept of a closer European Political Cooperation.
- 1975: Helsinki Final Act.
- 1992: Signing Maastricht Treaty and implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy as one of three pillars of the EU.
- 1997: Signing Amsterdam Treaty integrating the Petersberg Tasks from the WEU.
- 1999: Council Meeting formulating the Helsinki Headline Goals on military capacities.
- 2003: First CSDP missions and operations, adoption of the European Security Strategy and of the Berlin Plus Arrangements between NATO and the EU.
- 2004: Headline Goals 2010.
- 2009: Implementation of Lisbon Treaty including the idea of European solidarity.¹⁴

All these events followed the idea of “an ever-closer union” and led to a new strategy paper: The Global Strategy of the EU.¹⁵

4.2 The Global Strategy of the EU and current Developments

In 2016 the EU implemented the Global Strategy as an answer to challenges and threats of the 21st century.¹⁶ This step was the logical consequence from the political integration process of the EU since the entry of force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. Additionally, the stronger importance of the Common Security and Defence Policy includes the idea of solidarity and a collective defence.¹⁷ The title of the EUGS “Shared Vision, Common Action: A stronger Europe” makes clear that the EU is currently in a longer lasting process in order to enhance European politics, and to improve structures and instruments of the

14 Cf.: Ibid. P. 19.

15 Cf.: Homepage of the Council of the EU. Page Library. URL.: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/documents-publications/library/library-blog/posts/ever-closer-union-the-legacy-of-the-treaties-of-rome-for-today-s-europe-1957-2017-online-exhibition/>. [11-11-19].

15 Cf.: Homepage of the Council of the EU. Page Library. URL.: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/de/documents-publications/library/library-blog/posts/ever-closer-union-the-legacy-of-the-treaties-of-rome-for-today-s-europe-1957-2017-online-exhibition/>. [11-11-19].

16 Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 20-23.

17 Cf.: Ibid. P. 18.

EU.¹⁸ In its conclusion the EUGS states clearly: “*We must now swiftly translate this vision into action.*”¹⁹ Very soon after publishing the European Global Strategy some major steps followed. These steps were:

- Agreement on an Implementation Plan of the EUGS.²⁰
- Agreement on a common level of ambition.²¹
- The European Defence Action Plan.²²
- Establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) on security and defence.²³

Because of these developments a lot of research is focused on these concrete actions based on the EUGS. This can be proven by the annual reports by the commission on the implementation of the EUGS.²⁴

18 Cf.: Ibid. P. 38.

19 EEAS (2016). Op. cit. P. 51.

20 Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 35.

21 Cf.: Ibid. P. 36.

22 Cf.: Ibid. P. 24-25.

23 Cf.: Ibid. P. 38.

24 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service. Subpage EU-Global Strategy. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eu-global-strategy_en. [23-11-19].

5. Research Gap

“We Europeans must really take our fate fully into our own hands. (...) we should work on a vision of one day establishing a real European army.”²⁵

This statement of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel from November 2018 in a speech at the European Parliament in Strasbourg seems to represent the missing link between “strategic autonomy” and the CSDP of the EU.

In addition, up to this point the author has shown common aspects of the CSDP and the idea of “strategic autonomy”. It seems to be common sense, that there is a close link between these two concepts. Especially when it comes to concrete military and foreign policy measures by the EU and its Member States, “strategic autonomy” is very often a strong argument.²⁶

However, among the existing research the answer to the specific context between “strategic autonomy” and the CSDP has not been given yet.²⁷ This is the author’s aim by editing this essay.

25 Homepage of Reuters. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-politics-merkel/germanys-merkel-calls-for-a-european-union-military-idUSKCN1NI1UQ>. [11-11-19].

26 Cf.: Homepage of European Council on foreign Relations (ECFR). URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy. [9-11-19].

27 Statement by the author.

6. Research Questions

The main aim of this essay is to find the link between the concept of “strategic autonomy” and the CSDP of the EU. In order to describe and to find this context, the key question for this paper is:

What is the context between “strategic autonomy” and the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU?

In order to answer this research question, three supplemental questions must be answered. These ones are as follows:

- Supplemental question number 1: What are the preconditions that led to the idea of “strategic autonomy”?
- Supplemental question number 2: What is the understanding of “strategic autonomy” of the EU?
- Supplemental question number 3: What are the goals of the CSDP of the EU?

7. Methodology

In order to achieve a valid and reliable result, the author uses a wide range of sources in gathering the essential information for this essay. These sources range from EU documents, books, online articles, and academic journals to officially published internet-based information.

First, the research gap was explored, and three supplemental questions were formulated in order to get a better understanding of the topic. In addition, this method makes it easier to answer the main question. At the end the answers of the three supplemental questions lead to the answer of the main question and the discussion as the conclusion of the essay. The methodical approach of this essay is the author-based interpretation, also known as hermeneutics. On the following sketch the author shows the structure of the research work and the steps that led to the results while editing this essay.




Figure 1: Flowchart of the methodical approach.²⁸

8. Research and Results of Research

8.1 Preconditions of the Development of “strategic Autonomy”

8.1.1 A changed Global Order

The EU faces a changed world with different types of threats and challenges. Europe is no longer only the little brother of the US and the possible battlefield of the Cold War. It is today situated in the centre of different global players in a multipolar world.²⁹ In addition, the EU tries to find its role as a political power and one pole among others like the US, Russia or China.³⁰ Also smaller countries as Turkey, Brazil and India try to find their place in the world; and use their economic and political influence as a regional power with growing impact abroad their borders. This stresses the traditional leading nations and organisations and puts the EU under pressure.³¹

The United Nations (UN) lost their importance and today the conflicts are marked by the right of the stronger. This is very well shown by the conflicts in Syria and the Ukraine, where different regional and global parties try to increase their influence without legal legitimisation.³² The aim of the EU is not only to defend its interests and values against such an order, but also to be a role model for a world of peace and prosperity based on the principles of humanity and the rule of international law. These values should be shared with partners in order to enlarge the idea of good global governance for the 21st century.³³

29 Cf.: Homepage Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Translated into English the name means: Foundation for Science and Politics. URL.: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e773>. [25-11-19].

30 Cf.: Ibid.

31 Cf.: Ibid.

32 Cf.: Homepage of Carnegie Middle East Centre. URL.: <https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/54733>. [25-11-19].

33 Cf.: Rehrl, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 23.

8.1.2 A changed NATO and “America first”

In parallel to the changes after the end of the Cold War the relationship of EU and the US changed. The protection of the US is no longer needed, the role of NATO as an instrument of collective defence is in certain ways reduced, and there are fewer common interests of the EU and the US.³⁴ President Bush for example created the coalition of the willing and made a coordinated reaction of NATO or EU impossible.³⁵ Also the migration crises made clear, that Europe suffers more from conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa and has own interests in these regions.³⁶

In addition, the vote of President Trump is still a game changer. His motto “America First” has the consequence, that the EU is no longer an exclusive partner or allied. It must define its role in the transatlantic partnership from one situation to another.³⁷ Political as well as economic differences affect this relationship. These differences are for example:

- Importance of NATO as an instrument of collective defence.
- Relationship to Russia and Turkey.³⁸
- US tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium.³⁹
- Trumps political support for the BREXIT.⁴⁰

Related to last discussions about the role of NATO, the US and EU, triggered by President Macron, the former US ambassador Anthony Gardner stated in an interview: “*Trump*

34 Cf.: H. Brands. (2017). Wandel in der außenpolitischen Doktrin der USA. In: BMLVS/ Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik. Sicher. Und Morgen? Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2018. Translated into English the title means: Change in the Foreign Policy Doctrine of the USA. In: Secure. And tomorrow? Annual Security Policy Forecast 2018. Vienna. P. 70-73.

35 Cf.: Homepage of Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). URL.: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/coalition-willing>. [25-11-19].

36 Assessment by the author.

37 Cf.: Homepage Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Translated into English the name means: Foundation for Science and Politics. URL.: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e773>. [25-11-19].

38 Cf.: S. Genç. (2017). Türkei 2018. In: BMLVS/ Direktion für Sicherheitspolitik. Sicher. Und Morgen? Sicherheitspolitische Jahresvorschau 2018. Translated into English the title means: Turkey 2018. In: Secure. And tomorrow? Annual Security Policy Forecast 2018. Vienna. P. 101-103.

39 Cf.: Homepage of the Royal Institute of international Affairs. Chatham house. URL.: <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/us-eu-trade-relations-trump-era-which-way-forward>. [25-11-19].

40 Cf.: Homepage of European Council on foreign Relations (ECFR). URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy. [25-11-19].

prefers to deal one-on-one in a transnational way with particular states of the EU”.⁴¹

This leads to incoherent politics and national strategies among the EU Member States.

8.2 The Content of “strategic Autonomy”

The answer to that changed global order is the EU Global Strategy. It defines the strategic goals for the external actions of the EU. These goals are:

- The security of the EU.
- State and societal resilience to our East and South.
- An integral approach to conflicts.
- Cooperative regional orders.
- Global governance for the 21st century.⁴²

These priorities should be achieved and supported by strategic autonomy. The core of the idea of strategic autonomy seems to be political and military independence as a multi-lateral organisation. According to Ronja Kemping and Barbara Kunz this autonomy has three dimensions:

- *„Political Autonomy: The capacity to take security policy decisions and to act upon them”.*
- *„Industrial autonomy: The capacity to develop and build the capabilities required to attain operational autonomy”.*
- *„Operational Autonomy: The capacity to independently plan for and conduct civilian and/or military operations”.*⁴³

The EU tries to bring these three dimensions to life. In addition, the implementation of the EUGS follows these dimensions as well. On the pages below, the author takes a closer look at these dimensions.

41 Cf.: Homepage of Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC). URL.: <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/12/trump-making-a-historical-mistake-with-eu-former-us-diplomat-says.html>. [25-11-19].

42 Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 21-23.

43 Cf.: Homepage of the Institute Français de Relations International. Page Publications. URL.: <https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/notes-cerfa/france-germany-and-quest-european-strategic-autonomy-franco>. [25-11-19].

8.2.1 Political Autonomy

The EUGS says: „*The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states, (...) are key elements of the European security order.*”⁴⁴ This makes clear: The core of a political autonomy are independent decision-making processes. Based on sovereignty of the Member States, the EU establishes the framework of autonomy and solidarity.⁴⁵ “Strategic autonomy” makes it possible to decide and to act independently. The goals of these decisions are protection of European citizens, defence of European values and interests, guarantee of political, economic, and social stability.⁴⁶ This must be done freely and unaffected by other powers and on a broad legitimated basis.⁴⁷ Of course, the principle of unanimity in the CSDP is a controversial factor, but cannot be discussed here.⁴⁸ This is beyond the scope of this essay. Additionally, the EU recognised, that sovereignty and independence need strong instruments.

8.2.2 Industrial Autonomy

One instrument is an autonomous defence industry, that makes the EU independent from foreign technologies and imports of military goods. The EUGS clearly states: “*A sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is essential for Europe’s strategic autonomy and for a credible CSDP.*”⁴⁹ In addition the EU Member States understand that the European defence industry sector is ineffective and driven by national interests. In 2015 – for example – the armed forces of the 28 EU Member States operated 154 weapon systems, ran 37 types of armoured personnel carriers and 19 types of combat aircrafts.⁵⁰ In this field the EU and its Member States make the largest steps to

44 EEAS (2016). P. 33

45 Cf.: Homepage Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). URL.: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e773>. [25-11-19].

46 Cf.: EEAS (2016). Op. cit. Passim.

47 Cf.: Homepage Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). URL.: <https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019RP04/#hd-d14204e773>. [25-11-19].

48 Cf.: Ibid.

49 EEAS (2016). Op. cit. P. 45.

50 Cf.: Rehl, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 39.

the future. The implementation of the European Defence Action Plan, the European Defence Fund and the agreement on PESCO are direct results from the implementation of the EUGS.

Especially PESCO became the major tool to work closely together and to enhance interoperability. 25 partnering EU Member States agreed on 47 security and defence related projects and made the idea of a more capable and resilient EU becoming true.⁵¹ These projects range from capacity building programmes and defence industry developments to the implementation of common command and communication structures. They represent the will to coordinate the activities and to cooperate in the field of CSDP and they are a major signal to become strategically autonomous.⁵²

8.2.3 Operational Autonomy

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is more than a pool of projects of the defence industries in Europe. It is a major project to develop common capacities and capabilities within the EU. Based on the protocol No 10 on permanent structured cooperation established by Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), PESCO is an instrument to engage in a “(...) *common foreign and security policy based on the achievement of growing convergence of action by Member States*”.⁵³

The goal is to develop defence capabilities together and make them available for CSDP operations.⁵⁴ PESCO is financed by the European Defence Fund and by money from the Member States. Additionally, it is evaluated on a regular basis by an instrument called Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD).⁵⁵ Especially CARD sets a new standard. It provides common guidelines on the political and operational level and makes

51 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service. Subpage Headquarters. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/70328/european-cooperation-defence-eu-ministers-agree-13-new-pesco-projects_en. [23-11-19].

52 Cf.: Homepage of European Council on foreign Relations (ECFR). URL: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/scorecard/independence_play_europes_pursuit_of_strategic_autonomy. [25-11-19].

53 Homepage of European Law Lexicon. EUR-Lex. URL.: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008M%2FPRO%2F10>. [25-11-19].

54 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service. Page Factsheet PESCO. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/pesco_factsheet_may_2019.pdf. [25-11-19].

55 Cf.: Homepage of European Defence Agency (EDA). URL.: [https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-\(card\)](https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card)). [25-11-19].

the EU more independent from NATO in the field of standardisation and interoperability.⁵⁶

Of course, the EU follows the concept of the Integrated Approach and does not only use military means, but armed forces play a more important role for the future strategies of the EU.⁵⁷

In addition, the implementation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) as an operational headquarters for training and monitoring missions – such as the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM MALI) – is a clear signal to become more independent from structures of the EU MS and of NATO.⁵⁸ By the implementation of the EUGS and PESCO the EU enhanced the instruments and structures to accomplish the main goals of the CSDP following the given strategic priorities autonomously. The EU is in certain fields – such as crisis management – more independent from major powers and their structures.⁵⁹

8.3 The Goals of the CSDP of the EU

In general, the tasks of operations and missions are defined by the so-called common level of ambition from the EUGS Implementation Plan. This represents also the core of the strategic priorities of the EU, namely:

- Response to external conflicts.
- Building capacities of partners.
- Protection of the EU and its citizens.⁶⁰

In addition, the EEAS writes: *“The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention*

56 Cf.: Homepage of Egmont Royal Military Institute. URL.: <http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/03/SPB109.pdf?type=pdf>. [25-11-19].

57 Cf.: Ibid. [25-11-19].

58 Cf.: Homepage of European External Action Service (EEAS). Page Factsheet MPCC. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf. [25-11-19].

59 Cf.: Homepage of Centre for Eastern Studies Warsaw. URL.: <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-06-28/csdps-renaissance-challenges-and-opportunities-eastern-flank>. [25-11-19].

60 Cf.: Rehr, J. (2017). Op. cit. P. 36 and P.43.

and in the strengthening of the international security.”⁶¹ These three goals meet very well the common level of ambition and bring it to live by real actions.⁶²

61 Homepage of European External Action Service (EEAS). Page CSDP. URL.: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/431/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en. [25-11-19].

62 Statement of the author.

9. Discussion of Results and personal Conclusions⁶³

9.1 Discussion of Results

A famous proverb says, a picture is worth a thousand words. Therefore, the author wants to sum up the results in a chart. The figure below explains the context of strategic autonomy and answers the key question for this essay. Starting from the EUGS from 2016 and the Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, it illustrates the impact and relations on the different levels and structures of the EU. In general, the strategic level, represented by the Global Strategy and the Implementation Plan sets the political goals for the CFSP. These goals are realised by instruments of CFSP and CSDP on the operational level. PESCO on the third level provides the necessary capacities and capabilities for operations and missions.




Figure 2: The Context of Strategic Autonomy and CSDP.⁶⁴

63 Based on the authors interpretation.

64 Figure created by the author.

Strategic autonomy as a political term represents the frame of CSDP. Because of its three dimensions, it has direct impact on all three levels shown in the sketch. This impact is the closer context between CSDP and strategic autonomy. The author states therefore: The context between CSDP and strategic autonomy is its function for the further development of CSDP.

However, there is also a broader context. In the European framework strategic autonomy has a double meaning. It is on the one hand a tool for a stronger political and military integration in Europe. As this tool it led to major developments like PESCO, the creation of the European Defence Fund and the implementation of MPCC in times of different challenges and new threats.

On the other hand, strategic autonomy is an aim of the CFSP and of course for CSDP as its part. It is a desired end state of a fully capable, credible, and responsible powerful European Union. This is denoted in the sketch as collective defence and the question mark stands for the unknown future of this development. This Union could be a global partner for peace and stability, which decides, acts and defends itself independently and without any differences among its Member States.

9.2 Personal Conclusion

The results from above meet the author’s definition from the beginning. This is: The ability for the EU to act and make decisions independently in order to achieve common long-term purposes including the process of planning and the execution of actions. The EU also makes major steps to become a more independent power. Nevertheless, reality paints an indifferent picture.

The problem of the BREXIT, which has a strong importance for the military capacities of the EU, could not be solved yet. In addition, CSDP depends from the will and the ability of the EU Member States. The leading powers – such as France or Germany – take political initiatives to enhance the military cooperation, but smaller countries follow their own national interests. The problem of neutrality of Austria or Ireland plays no major role on the political stage in Brussels. However, it can be a major issue for voters in national elections. Additionally, smaller countries do not spend a lot on defence and use solidarity and economic reasons as excuse. History has proven, that strong nations need credible military capacities, and the common will to use them. The EU created the basis for such

an evolution. Now the Member States’ politicians must show their will to go further to bring strategic autonomy to life in order to keep this unique project of peace and stability.

10. Annexes

10.1 List of Abbreviations

CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EC	European Commission
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
EEC	European Economic Community
EEAS	European Union External Action Service
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EU MS	European Union Member States
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the European Commission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UN	United Nations
US	United States

10.2 List of Figures

Figure Number	Description	Page
1	Flowchart of Methodology	10
2	Context of Strategic Autonomy and CSDP	18

10.3 List of Literature

10.3.1 Documents

- 01 EEAS (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels.

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11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person’s thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarise, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.



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(PACHUCKI-BAMMER, Fhr)

Wiener Neustadt, Austria in December 2019